{"id":1017,"date":"2013-05-28T10:59:09","date_gmt":"2013-05-28T02:59:09","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/balaymindanaw.org\/main\/?p=1017"},"modified":"2014-01-21T14:48:14","modified_gmt":"2014-01-21T06:48:14","slug":"terminated-peace-talks-intensified-armed-conflict-what-is-to-be-done","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/balaymindanaw.org\/main\/2013\/05\/28\/terminated-peace-talks-intensified-armed-conflict-what-is-to-be-done\/","title":{"rendered":"Terminated Peace Talks, Intensified Armed Conflict: What is to be done?"},"content":{"rendered":"

Terminated Peace Talks, Intensified Armed Conflict:\u00a0 What is to be done?<\/strong>[1]<\/p>\n

\u00a0By Soliman M. Santos, Jr.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Naga City, 27 May 2013<\/p>\n

(On the 55th<\/sup> birth anniversary of the late Jesse M. Robredo)<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 For all intents and purposes, the peace negotiations between the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP), as we have known it over the years since 1992, have effectively come to an end, at least under the current Aquino administration which still has three years left in its term.\u00a0 Well, that is just as well.\u00a0 Late last year, I had already personally gone on record through a 10-page article saying that it was better to just drop the charade<\/em> of peace talks that were going nowhere due to their extremely tactical dynamics.[2] \u00a0In the ensuing blame game that is still part of those counter-productive dynamics, the GPH is being blamed by the NDFP for unceremoniously terminating the talks purportedly to seek a \u201cnew approach\u201d thereto.\u00a0 But under the circumstances, the GPH can be given some credit for this bold, if belated, move of dropping the charade even at the propaganda\/public image risk of being blamed as responsible for terminating the talks.<\/p>\n

But really, this peace process should no longer, even if it still could, continue to be conducted \u201cin the old way\u201d (to use revolutionary situation phraseology) that has made it a process of \u201cperpetual division between the Parties.\u201d\u00a0 The test of the pudding is in the eating, and the taste of the pudding has for the most part been bitter, sour and stale.\u00a0 A break or real vacation from this status of belligerency (or strategic stalemate), as it were, in negotiations should prove salutary in the medium to long term, if it becomes an occasion for all concerned to take serious pause and rethink things.<\/p>\n

New Realities<\/span><\/p>\n

The end of the peace negotiations as we have known it<\/strong> is the key new reality now in the GPH-NDFP front of more war than peace at least under the coming three-year second half of the Aquino administration.\u00a0 NDFP Chief Political Consultant and Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) leader Prof. Jose Maria Sison has already said, \u201cits three remaining years is not too long to let pass,\u201d \u00a0in the context of waiting for a new administration to resume peace talks with, as is usual for new administrations.\u00a0 The better in the meantime for the NDFP to ramp up the armed struggle with full focus and with a view to gain a position of strength for whatever future negotiations or eventuality.\u00a0 \u00a0Here are a few more specific realities on this front that have bearing on what is to be done for the peace process factoring in these realities:<\/p>\n

—\u00a0 \u201cIntensified tactical offensives<\/strong> by the New People\u2019s Army (NPA)<\/strong>\u201d: \u00a0this was already indicated by Sison and is being indicated by incidents on the ground.\u00a0 The presidential spokesperson has dismissed this as \u201cIt\u2019s nothing new\u201d but there are actually some foreboding new directives in the CPP Statement on the 44th<\/sup> Anniversary of the NPA (29 March 2013) like \u201cbuilding guerrilla theaters [that] bring together the power of three to four guerrilla fronts that can reach brigade strength,\u201d \u201cadvanc[ing] wave upon wave from the existing guerrilla fronts to create new guerrilla fronts,\u201d and \u201cfield[ing] strike forces to intensify the tactical offensives.\u201d GPH Negotiating Panel chair Usec. Alexander A. Padilla, for his part, says that there is no GPH plan for an \u201call-out war\u201d\u00a0 (recall then President Corazon Aquino\u2019s \u201cunleashing the sword of total war\u201d against the NPA after the collapse of the peace talks in 1987).\u00a0 The NDFP however expects that the GPH is \u201cnow unencumbered in waging its Oplan Bayanihan war of suppression.\u201d\u00a0 The CPP-NPA itself, even before this latest breakdown, has always felt unencumbered to \u201ccarry out the [five-year] plan to advance from the strategic defensive to the strategic stalemate.\u201d<\/p>\n

— Though this sounds like stating the obvious, there will definitely be no general ceasefire, as the CPP-NPA-NDFP does not want it<\/strong> (this is what is \u201cnothing new\u201d).<\/p>\n

—\u00a0 On the other hand, the GPH wants a ceasefire or truce to be in place in any further peace talks due to an overriding concern to lower the level of, if not end, the violence on the ground.<\/p>\n

—\u00a0 But there will be no return to both the \u201cregular track\u201d and the \u201cspecial track\u201d of the peace talks, as the GPH will have none of that anymore<\/strong>.\u00a0 Precisely, it seeks a still undefined \u201cnew approach\u201d but there are serious doubts that one can be found that is mutually acceptable with the NDFP which is asserting the \u201cold way\u201d of the peace talks.\u00a0 The \u201cnew approach\u201d of the GPH may thus develop, if at all, into something outside the peace talks, at least the formal peace negotiations between Negotiating Panels.<\/p>\n

—\u00a0 The only significant prior peace agreement left that is still mutually acceptable<\/strong> is the 1998 Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL)<\/strong>, but not its problematic propaganda-prone and stalemate-prone Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) mechanism.\u00a0 That is far as the GPH is concerned.\u00a0\u00a0 The GPH will definitely no longer go by the 1992 Hague Joint Declaration<\/strong>, which was the long-time framework agreement for the \u201cregular track,\u201d as well as by the 1995 Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG), which has occasioned the main recent non-substantive stumbling block issue of the GPH non-release of remaining claimed NDFP consultants who are still detained.<\/p>\n

—\u00a0 The NDFP \u201ccontinues to assert the validity and binding nature of [all] the previously forged joint documents\u201d and will resume formal peace negotiations only \u201con the basis of upholding, respecting and implementing previously signed agreements.\u201d \u00a0For the CPP, these agreements represent no less than its correct strategy and tactics as well as gains in the peace negotiations. \u00a0Since the GPH will definitely no longer go by the framework Hague Joint Declaration, among others, then there will likely be no resumption of formal peace negotiations under the Aquino administration<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

[It might be noted here parenthetically that framework agreements<\/strong> are not written in stone and can change, as they have, at particular junctures of the peace process.\u00a0 The best local example of this is the peace negotiations with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) where there have been at least three framework agreements: \u00a0the 1998 General Framework of Agreement of Intent, the 2001 Tripoli Agreement on Peace, and the 2012 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB).\u00a0 The problem is that this is not an acceptable model for the NDFP which predictably derides that peace process as \u201cU.S.-backed\u201d since 2008 and also lately its once tactical ally, the MILF, for entering into the FAB as \u201ccapitulation to the Manila government.\u201d]<\/p>\n

—\u00a0 The GPH has broached the possibility of pursuing \u201clocalized peace talks.\u201d<\/strong>\u00a0 This could be still national-level peace talks with the local or in-country actual leadership of the CPP or, more feasibly in the GPH view, local-level peace talks from the regional level down though the scope of such talks are not yet clear.\u00a0 The CPP leadership has already shot this down, saying that \u201cNot a single unit of the NPA, committee of the CPP or organs of the NDFP will fall for the Aquino trap of \u2018localized peace talks\u2019\u2026 Only the NDFP Negotiating Panel is authorized to engage the reactionary government in peace negotiations.\u201d<\/p>\n

Our Urgent Tasks<\/span>[3]<\/p>\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 This article is addressed to the GPH, the NDFP, the Royal Norwegian Government (RNG) Third Party Facilitator and civil society peace advocates.\u00a0 While we agree that a \u201cnew approach\u201d or a new way is needed in the GPH-NDFP peace process (which is not just formal peace negotiations), we are not here outlining certain tasks and imperatives as necessarily part of or inputs for the kind of \u201cnew approach\u201d that the GPH seeks.\u00a0\u00a0 Our standpoint is not that of the GPH or, for that matter, of the NDFP in adversarial relations with each other, rather ours is the standpoint of an independent <\/em>civil society peace advocate who supports peace processes for the resolution of armed conflicts.\u00a0 So, to a large extent, this article is addressed to similarly oriented peace advocates on what is to be done.\u00a0 While focused now on more scaled down and doable<\/strong> tasks in the current situation that will likely extend throughout the second half of the Aquino administration, there are definitely implications for beyond that.\u00a0 Much of what follows has been said by us before but these are now reframed under the current situation<\/strong> that has emerged:<\/p>\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a01.<\/strong> FOCUS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS ARISING FROM INTENSIFIED ARMED HOSTILITIES. <\/strong>\u00a0This is the obvious no-brainer <\/em>most urgent task<\/strong> that is not only a most felt need<\/strong> but is also, believe it or not, of common or mutual desire and interest<\/strong> of both the GPH and NDFP.\u00a0 This arises from the emerging intensification of the armed conflict, the continuing absence of a ceasefire, and the remaining mutual acceptability of the CARHRIHL as a term of reference.\u00a0 The CARHRIHL, as the first and likely only substantive agreement between the GPH and NDFP, or more broadly, respect for \u00a0human rights (HR) and international humanitarian law (IHL), may be \u201cthe only game in town\u201d on the GPH-NDFP front, but it certainly better than \u201cplaying our charade\u201d of peace talks of \u201cperpetual division.\u201d\u00a0 It is also the next best thing to a ceasefire<\/em> in terms of lowering the level of violence on the ground and thus saving some lives.<\/p>\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 This most urgent task may be done both inside and outside the GPH-NDFP peace negotiations, as it may also be done at the national and local levels<\/strong>.\u00a0 Inside the GPH-NDFP peace process, while the substantive negotiations are in suspended animation (many will say \u201cit\u2019s nothing new\u201d anyway), the Parties or Negotiating Panels may consider devoting some useful time to instead working on the implementation of the CARHRIHL.\u00a0 But one challenge to them here is whether they (esp. the NDFP) can work together beyond the problematic propaganda-prone and stalemate-prone JMC mechanism which the GPH will apparently no longer go by.\u00a0 Only by working together can they possibly (though this is no assurance that they can) sort out honest differences of interpretation even regarding the mutually acceptable CARHRIHL, notably when it comes to the use of landmines. \u00a0But for God\u2019s sake, let not this \u201conly game in town\u201d that is the CARHRIHL become another \u201cdocument of perpetual division between the Parties.\u201d\u00a0 Both Parties can of course, at the very least, each unilaterally implement the CARHRIHL as they respectively interpret it, including by bringing their respective justice systems to bear on HR and IHL violations.\u00a0 Let it be a contest, if it must be, on which is the more effective government in repressing HR and IHL violations.<\/p>\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Let them not forget that the CARHRIHL itself goes beyond CARHRIHL<\/strong> by its reference to \u201cthe principles and standards embodied in international instruments on human rights\u201d (Part III, Article 1), to \u201cgenerally accepted principles and standards of international humanitarian law\u201d (Part IV, Article 1), to \u201cthe full scope of human rights, including civil political, economic, social and cultural rights\u201d (Part II, Article 3), and to \u201cuniversally applicable principles and standards of human rights and of international humanitarian law\u2026 embodied in the instruments signed by the Philippines and deemed to be mutually applicable and acceptable by both Parties\u201d (Part II, Article 4).\u00a0 Indeed, respect for HR and IHL is not limited by what is specifically provided for by the CARHRIHL, esp. on the part of the GPH which has its own HR and IHL treaty obligations and as well as its own HR- and IHL-related national laws. \u00a0We have already written on how the CARHRIHL can be maximized through its treaty connection that makes available to the Parties \u201cthe best that has been created by humanity\u201d (to again use revolutionary phraseology) in terms of HR and IHL.[4]<\/p>\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 In fact, come to think of it, the CARHRIHL provision that \u201cThe parties shall uphold, protect and promote the full scope of human rights\u2026\u201d can become the basis for further agreements on socio-economic reforms and political-constitutional reforms even without reference to The Hague Joint Declaration<\/strong> and the 1995 Joint Agreement on the Formation, Sequence and Operationalization of the Reciprocal Working Committees (RWCs).\u00a0\u00a0 We have also already written on a rights-based approach<\/strong> (RBA) to the peace talks, particularly when it comes to socio-economic and political reforms which address the roots of the armed conflict and lay the basis for a just and lasting peace.[5] We there cited the 2004 masteral thesis of now Commission on Human Rights (CHR) commissioner Atty. Jose Manuel S. Mamauag on a RBA as tool in evaluating the socio-political dimension of the GRP-MILF peace process.[6]\u00a0 The RBA has started to be used for development and for governance; why not as a framework for the whole peace process and a peace settlement?<\/p>\n

The previous work and drafts on a Comprehensive Agreement on Socio-Economic Reforms (CASER) and\u00a0 on a Comprehensive Agreement on Political and Constitutional Reforms (CAPCR) need not be laid to waste as these can probably still be made use of but possibly reframed under a RBA<\/strong> though not necessarily in comprehensive agreement form.\u00a0 But we may be getting too far ahead of ourselves at this present juncture.\u00a0 As we said, the minimum focus for now should just be better implementation of the CARHRIHL, whether the Parties work on this together (which still remains to be seen) or separately.\u00a0 Either way, any progress on this would\/should help build confidence for whatever future substantive negotiations<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

HR and IHL are ultimately too important to be left at the mercy of the JMC mechanism or even of the warring Parties themselves, esp. at the national level.\u00a0\u00a0 We have to break out of the stalemated dynamics of the peace negotiations, and all concerned, not just the two warring Parties, have to find new and better ways of civilian protection<\/strong>.\u00a0 For one, the CPP-NPA-NDFP national leadership should no longer discourage or prohibit its local commands from local-level talks<\/span> that would more expeditiously and effectively address humanitarian concerns arising from armed hostilities at that level, as distinguished from \u201clocalized peace talks\u201d<\/span> that would purport to address national issues that are beyond and therefore cannot really be fully addressed at that level. This kind of local-level talks should no longer be proscribed by that leadership as necessarily a counter-insurgency trap to pacify, divide and induce the capitulation of the revolutionary forces.<\/p>\n

Relatedly, local-level talks initiated by conflict-affected local communities, inc. their local officials (like the late long-time and exemplary Naga City Mayor Jesse M. Robredo once did), that seek respect for their own genuine declarations of their communities as \u201cpeace zones<\/strong>\u201d that are off-limits to armed hostilities, should not be treated as necessarily a counter-insurgency measure to cramp or limit the areas for NPA tactical offensives.\u00a0 The whole countryside is vast enough for that, as the annual CPP and NPA anniversary statements never fail to point out.<\/p>\n

Civil society peace groups like notably Sulong CARHRIHL<\/em> (Advance CARHRIHL) have tried to make CARHRIHL work even without the stalemated JMC mechanism, albeit Sulong CARHRIHL<\/em> has focused mainly on work at the local community level, where after all the work is most needed.\u00a0 But of course the broad work of advancing HR and IHL is not limited to and by the CARHRIHL.\u00a0 The broad array of IHL (and also HR) advocates, inc. the Civil Society Initiatives for International Humanitarian Law (CSI-IHL), who had gathered around the first National Summit on\u00a0 IHL in 2009<\/strong> have significantly since then taken on and stepped up the work to address the relevant main challenges of:\u00a0 [1] humanitarian intervention especially during massive internal displacement due to armed hostilities; [2] education, information and communications on IHL (and HR); and [3] monitoring, investigation and prosecution of IHL (and HR) violations in the context of the armed conflict.<\/p>\n

In terms of exploring alternative institutional mechanisms for that last most difficult challenge of monitoring\/investigation of and accountability for IHL (and HR) violations, the 2009 IHL Summit for one called on the CHR to develop its own complementary or fallback mechanism to the JMC<\/strong>.\u00a0 It is good that an independent constitutional commission mandated for human rights concerns, with nationwide offices, and with international links, is giving attention also to the related but distinct field of IHL and to HR-IHL violations not only of the state armed forces but also of non-state armed groups.\u00a0 Seeking rebel accountability is a special challenge in itself due to various conceptual and practical reasons, including their having \u201cno permanent address.\u201d<\/p>\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 The work of upholding respect for HR and IHL in the context of the GPH-NDFP armed conflict may be well below the ideal and the high policy level of a negotiated political settlement.\u00a0 But aside from its more immediate value of civilian protection, HR-IHL work has a long-term strategic value and direction<\/strong> of laying better ground (and lowering the costs and antagonism) for a negotiated political settlement when the requisite political will and also paradigm shifts on both sides come about, hopefully sooner rather than later.<\/p>\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 2.\u00a0 CONDUCT PURPOSIVE KEY REFORM WORK OUTSIDE THE PEACE TALKS BUT WELL INFORMED BY IT.<\/strong>\u00a0 Both the GPH and the NDFP actually agree that the \u201cpursuit of social, economic and political reforms\u201d are \u201caimed at addressing the root causes of internal armed conflicts.\u201d\u00a0 For the GPH, this is the first of its \u201cSix Paths to Peace\u201d framework which also has \u201cpeaceful negotiated settlement with the different rebel groups\u201d as its third path and \u201caddressing concerns arising from continuing armed hostilities\u201d as its fourth path \u2013 the latter being relevant to our first urgent task above.\u00a0\u00a0 Indeed, the comprehensive peace process is broader than just peace negotiations.\u00a0 Socio-economic, political and constitutional reforms are thus the core of the substantive agenda of the GPH-NDFP peace negotiations \u2013 and we can say this with or without the framework Hague Joint Declaration.\u00a0 But such reforms can and should be pursued even outside the peace talks because the reforms are of value also outside that context.\u00a0 They are undertaken for their own sake because they \u201cserve the people\u201d (to again use revolutionary phraseology).\u00a0 If the peace talks can benefit from inputs provided by reform work, inc. research, then so too can reform work outside the peace talks benefit from inputs that may be drawn from its own accumulated work and documents.<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Let it be clear that the motivation for this second urgent task should not be the often expressed intent, even among avowed peace advocates, of making the CPP-NPA-NDFP \u201cirrelevant.\u201d\u00a0 Such a disdainful or counter-insurgency attitude does not do justice or give due credit to some of the just causes of the armed struggle, even as the viability of this form of struggle has become questionable<\/strong>, to say the least, after 44 years since 1969 and at the cost of more than 120,000 lives.\u00a0 The Philippine Human Development Report 2005: Peace, Human Security and Human Development in the Philippines<\/em> said it well:<\/p>\n

The human development perspective instead chooses to take insurgencies and armed conflicts seriously as mirrors to society.\u00a0 To be sure, mirrors may be distorted to a greater or to a lesser extent: ideologies and pet theories may exaggerate certain objectionable features and details and hide others.\u00a0 Dealing with them squarely, however, will always provide an opportunity for the current system to peer closely at itself and discover at least some of its defects.<\/p>\n

The valuable contributions to the national agenda of the causes espoused by the various insurgencies are undeniable.\u00a0 The critique of the overweening influence of foreign powers (particularly the U.S.) \u00a0in the country\u2019s political life was provided primarily by the Left movement, a national debate that finally led to the removal of U.S. bases in the country.\u00a0 The decades-old socialist and communist advocacy for land redistribution culminated ultimately in the government\u2019s several agrarian reform programs\u2026.<\/p>\n

In many ways, the insurgencies have helped Filipinos and their governments realize how they ought to build a more just, more democratic society\u2026[7]<\/p>\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Thus, among the recommendations in the Philippine Human Development Report 2005<\/em> to \u201cplace the existing peace efforts on a sounder footing and lead to a solution to the conflict\u201d are to \u201cinstitute reforms in parallel\u201d to the GPH-NDFP peace negotiations, to \u201cundertake key reforms alongside and outside formal peace talks,\u201d and to \u201cundertake human development investments (in education, health, safe water, electricity and economic provisions) for their own sake.\u201d\u00a0 The key reforms referred to here are [1] electoral and governance reforms<\/strong> and [2] security sector reform<\/strong> (SSR).\u00a0 Instead of seeking to comprehensively cover socio-economic, political and constitutional reforms within a limited time frame of say three years, the idea is to focus first on a few choice issues of particular importance.<\/strong> The said two key reform areas are particularly important for the resolution of the armed conflict because of their relevance to the resort to armed struggle.<\/em>\u00a0 Also, SSR relates much to the above-discussed now first urgent task of focusing on HR-IHL concerns esp. vis-\u00e0-vis counter-insurgency strategy.<\/p>\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Electoral and military reforms in particular clash with key NDFP orthodoxies<\/em> or doctrines which are at the very heart of the national-democratic revolution.\u00a0 Elections clash with the NDFP view of armed struggle as the main form of struggle for social and political change, and so might confuse or deceive the people.\u00a0 The military in the NDFP\u2019s view is the main coercive instrument of the state which is to be smashed, not reformed or improved as such.\u00a0 As for good governance, the NDFP can be expected to again play the game of \u00a0\u201ctwo governments\u201d and ask which good governance is being referred to:\u00a0 that of the reactionary GPH or that of the revolutionary People\u2019s Democratic Government?<\/p>\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Yet, in the NDF\u2019s 1990 agenda for the peace talks<\/em> (though this was before the 1992 split in the CPP, after which the \u201creaffirmed\u201d line became harder), there were in fact talking points for electoral and military reforms.\u00a0 These included electoral reforms<\/em> allowing a fair chance for parties of the lower and middle classes, and also mechanisms to ensure fair and free elections.\u00a0 For military reforms<\/em>, there were removal of U.S. control over the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the reorganization, reorientation and reduction of the AFP.<\/p>\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Off-hand, there appear to be more mismatches than matches between the NDFP and GRP sides of the reform agenda.\u00a0 In the GRP 2003 Draft Final Peace Accord<\/em>, <\/strong>among the listed electoral reforms<\/em> <\/strong>are: \u00a0<\/strong>amended party-list, local sectoral representation, anti-dynasty, anti-turncoatism, strengthened multi-party system, political finance regulation, full automation, and Comelec reform.\u00a0\u00a0 While the security sector reforms<\/em> <\/strong>include:\u00a0 c<\/strong>ivilian supremacy measures like civil society participation in national security policy making;\u00a0 and a compact, efficient, responsive and modern AFP engaged in non-combat roles for nation-building.<\/p>\n

Electoral reforms are of particularly currency<\/strong> now in view of the just concluded 2013 mid-term national and local elections, and then the scheduled barangay elections later this year.\u00a0 There is also the recent Supreme Court decision in the Atong Paglaum<\/em> case on the party-list system with implications on the electoral chances of party-list groups representing marginalized and underrepresented sectors, including those that are the traditional mass base of the Left.\u00a0 Apart from in the party-list system, the candidates of the nat-dem Left have generally not fared well in electoral struggle, which can be an alternative form of political struggle.<\/p>\n

On the other hand, the regular election campaign periods have rather become occasions for the CPP-NPA-NDFP to assert its underground governmental authority over election campaigning in its claimed territories, with implications adverse to fair and free elections, if not the freedom of suffrage itself.\u00a0 It may thus be fair to pose to the CPP-NPA-NDFP whether its \u201cpermit to campaign\u201d policy and practice is also subject to electoral reform through the peace talks?<\/p>\n

As for socio-economic reforms, we already mentioned above that the previous work and drafts on a Comprehensive Agreement on Socio-Economic Reforms (CASER) need not be laid to waste as these can probably still be made use of but possibly reframed<\/em> under a RBA though not necessarily in comprehensive agreement form<\/strong>.\u00a0 Following the mode of focusing first on a few choice issues of particular importance, given a limited time frame like three years, the obvious choice socio-economic issue is land reform<\/strong>.\u00a0 This may as well be a third key reform area, along with electoral reform and SSR.\u00a0 In CPP-NPA-NDFP theory, the land problem of the peasantry is the main issue of the national-democratic revolution, and that has to be because the peasantry is the main force of this revolution.\u00a0 This armed revolution\u2019s crucial spearhead, the NPA, is a mainly peasant army and one of its key tasks is revolutionary land reform.\u00a0 To what extent can the peasant gains of revolutionary land reform be recognized and preserved as legitimate or legitimized land reform?<\/p>\n

But of course revolutionary land reform is not the only progressive land reform initiative.\u00a0 Going back to the RBA, there are agrarian reform workers outside the peace talks who are pushing for \u201crights-based asset (land) reform, founded on the idea of social justice,\u201d given the even more limited time frame until June 2014 of the government\u2019s extended Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) to distribute still over one million hectares of \u201cCARP-able\u201d private landholdings.\u00a0 There is thus a sense of urgency<\/strong> for this asset reform that somehow parallels the need for<\/em> a similar<\/em> sense of urgency on the GPH-NDFP front (while there is already such a sense of urgency on the GPH-MILF peace front) for the last three years of the Aquino administration).\u00a0 \u201cIn the final analysis, any effort to advance political reforms, no matter how eloquently stated, will become pure lip service in absence of an effective asset reform program.\u201d[8]\u00a0 It may thus be fair to also pose to the CPP-NPA-NDFP whether these efforts and gains of other progressive land reform initiatives like those in the Bondoc Peninsula can be respected and not be impeded by it for being necessarily political rivals in land reform or in serving the peasantry? \u00a0Can this, or some aspects of this, be the subject of local-level talks in Bondoc Peninsula?<\/p>\n

The breaking news from the Colombian peace process<\/strong> of a breakthrough interim agreement on land reform and rural development validates this as a key reform area that can become a crucial stepping stone or building block for the whole process.\u00a0 This is made relevant by the essential similarities between the Colombian and Philippine societies and revolutions, both led by foundationally Marxist-Leninist vanguard parties.\u00a0 Hopefully, there will be no derision this time of the Colombian peace process as \u201cU.S.-backed\u201d and of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) for its \u201ccapitulation to the Bogota government.\u201d \u00a0\u00a0It is also just as well timely that there has in the past few years been a quiet Philippines-Colombia civil society peace advocacy exchange program under the auspices of Conciliation Resources, which is an international NGO member of the International Contact Group (ICG) supporting the GPH-MILF peace process. Could a NDFP-FARC peace process exchange program perhaps also be developed?<\/p>\n

One important angle with all these three key reform areas \u2013 electoral reform, SSR, and land reform — is that there are several relevant ongoing civil society reform initiatives as well as academe-based policy study and research groups in each of these key reform areas<\/strong>, just like on HR-IHL concerns, that can also be engaged in moving the peace process forward.<\/p>\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a03. GET BACK WITH MORE AND PROPER ATTENTION TO THE SMALL PEACE PROCESSES.<\/strong>\u00a0 The GPH-NDFP peace process, the relatively successful (so far) GPH-MILF peace process and the implementation-problematic GPH-Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) peace process are the acknowledged big peace processes<\/strong>, because of the bigger rebel groups, the bigger geographical areas and the bigger issues involved.\u00a0 It is natural for the GPH to give more attention to these than to the small peace processes<\/strong> involving smaller rebel groups: the Cordillera People\u2019s Liberation Army (CPLA), the Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa ng Pilipinas<\/em> (RPM-P) and the Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa ng Mindanao<\/em> (RPM-M).<\/p>\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 The likely extended break in the GPH-NDFP peace talks for the three remaining years of the Aquino administration should be taken as an opportunity to get back with more and proper attention to the small peace processes.\u00a0 In general terms, there are two reasons for this:\u00a0 (1)\u00a0 If things are not moving in the big and more difficult peace processes, why not go for what can move and get done in the small and presumably easier peace processes?; and\u00a0 \u00a0(2) If you cannot do well in the small peace processes, how much more in the big peace processes?\u00a0 The CPLA, RPM-P and RPM-M are all relevant to the NDFP since they originated from this as breakaway factions<\/strong> that had split due to differing views on society, political programs, strategy and tactics \u2013 which are also all relevant to the peace process.<\/p>\n

Of these other, smaller peace processes, the most promising appears to be that with the RPM-M<\/strong> because of its innovative community-based approach.\u00a0 What is significant about the small peace process with the RPM-M is its effective combination of peace negotiations and public consultations:<\/p>\n

It has a radically different approach from that of the big top-level peace negotiations in that it does not involve complex peace negotiations.\u00a0 Rather, a local peace and development agenda that will have an immediate impact on the ground will be formulated by the concerned communities and tribes in Mindanao through participatory local consultations to identify problems and needs as well as responses there which could take the form of projects.\u00a0 Such empowered and sustainable communities are the real foundation of peace.\u00a0 The process itself will allow these communities to win small victories and build peace by themselves.\u00a0 The final political settlement is important but the communities need not wait for this.\u00a0 Building peace for them is here and now.\u00a0 This community-level process continues to be pursued independent of the panel-level talks and despite the latter\u2019s delay.\u00a0 Still, the RPM-M peace process is also getting back on the latter track which is still needed for a final resolution to the conflict.[9]<\/p>\n

If there is a need for models of authentic dialogue with the communities, here is one in Mindanao which also has the merit of upholding the equal importance of peace negotiations with rebel groups. If the idea is to bring the peace talks back to the public, there is a potential here for developing an effective combination of public consultations and peace negotiations, pursuant to the relatively new strategy of public participation in peacemaking.<\/strong>\u00a0 The RPM-M articulates this in this way:\u00a0 \u201cA community-based and people-centered peace negotiation among revolutionary groups with the government should be an insurance for achieving a sustained and genuine political settlement\u2026 The people should be seen as active participants and the principal stakeholders in any political settlement between the revolutionary groups and the government\u2026. And hence, the participation of the masses and the corresponding development of the political consciousness in all levels (and in all stages) of the peace process would ensure the substantive democratic content\u2026\u201d[10]<\/p>\n

Active and even direct participation of the people and communities in the peace process does not make the rebel\/revolutionary groups superfluous<\/em> because the latter, as the RPM-M says, are also \u201cincluded as among the legitimate stakeholders\u201d and should not be isolated from their respective mass bases or constituencies.[11] In addition, there is the pertinent analysis and approaches that these groups may contribute to the mutual problem-solving that is of the essence of peace negotiations.\u00a0 In the case of the RPM-M, it has adopted a multi-form struggle but gives paramount importance to peace-building\u00a0 and development work at this time because of the adverse effect of the war situation on the tri-peoples of Mindanao.\u00a0 At some point too, a convergence must be found among the several peace processes relevant to Mindanao, starting of course with those involving the MILF and the MNLF, but eventually co-relating on common aspects with the peace processes on the Communist front<\/strong> \u2013 whether on the minimum matter of \u201caddressing concerns arising from the continuing armed hostilities\u201d or on more substantive issues like the Lumad<\/em> Question.<\/p>\n

Also, because of the RPM-M\u2019s Mindanao tri-people orientation, there is a good prospect that the panel-level talks becoming a vehicle for lumad<\/em> concerns that can check-and-balance, as it were, the implications of the GPH-MILF peace negotiations on the interests of the non-Moro indigenous peoples in the territory of a new Bangsamoro autonomous political entity.\u00a0 This peace process which has been referred to as \u201cthe other peace process\u201d<\/strong> (presumably in relation to either that with the NDFP or that with the MILF) thus deserves some special attention, with good prospects for some deliverables, inc. in substantive agreements<\/strong>, before the close of the Aquino administration.\u00a0 Unfortunately, on the contrary, the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) under this administration has early on after its assumption to office in 2010, for some unclear reason, downgraded this process out even of its list of peace processes with rebel groups.\u00a0 The OPAPP should rectify this error and reinstate the peace process with the RPM-M back into its horizon.<\/em>\u00a0 On the other hand, the RPM-M would do good to send \u201cformal notice\u201d of its readiness to resume, so that there are no excuses or misreading of signals.<\/p>\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 As regards the other small peace processes with the CPLA and the RPM-P, and even with the big peace process with the MNLF, the OPAPP has tended to go for closure programs of socio-economic projects in exchange for disarmament and demobilization (in effect, DDR or Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) even without any really substantive agreements on the causes these several rebel groups respectively articulate or represent<\/em>, except in the case of the MNLF wherein there was a substantive Final Peace Agreement on Moro autonomy in 1996.\u00a0\u00a0 There do not appear to be substantive agreements on Cordillera autonomy along lines advocated by the CPLA, or on aspects of the socialist or workers\u2019 agenda represented by the RPM-P.\u00a0 Why then the seeming hurry for closure of the peace processes with the CPLA and RPM-P as if to just be able to close these chapters as completed and accomplished peace processes?\u00a0 Of course, it takes two to tango here.\u00a0 If the rebel group concerned considers it already a closure, then the GPH or OPAPP, and even peace advocates, cannot be \u201cholier than thou.\u201d\u00a0 But they risk repeating the mistakes of the history of DDR<\/strong> when it is not situated in a more comprehensive peace process or settlement that purposively addresses the substantive causes of their struggle.[12]<\/p>\n

Perhaps, it is just as well that the peace process with the RPM-M had been unceremoniously suspended (God forbid that it was discontinued) before it might have gone into similar closure mode.\u00a0 As we said at the outset, albeit in the context of the GPH-NDFP peace negotiations, sometimes a break or extended vacation from negotiations can be salutary, IF it becomes an occasion for all concerned to take serious pause and rethink things.\u00a0 This pause-taking and rethinking becomes all the more imperative when seeking a \u201cnew approach\u201d as regards the GPH-NDFP peace front.\u00a0 This search is of concern not just to one or both of the Parties but ultimately to all those who have a stake<\/strong> in the resolution of the armed conflict, under a favorable climate for peace negotiations, leading to the attainment of a just and lasting peace.\u00a0 Amen.<\/p>\n

———————————–<\/p>\n

\u00a0SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR. has been a long-time Bicolano human rights and IHL lawyer; legislative consultant and legal scholar; peace advocate, researcher and writer, whose initial engagement with the peace process was in Bicol with the first GRP-NDFP nationwide ceasefire in 1986.\u00a0 He is presently Presiding Judge of the 9th<\/sup> Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Nabua-Bato, Camarines Sur and Acting Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Balatan, Camarines Sur.<\/p>\n

\n
\n
\n

[1]\u00a0 With apologies to V.I. Lenin, What is to be done? Burning Questions of Our Movement<\/em> (1902).<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[2] \u00a0Soliman M. Santos, Jr., \u201cPeace Challenge II to the GPH and NDFP: Just drop the charade of peace talks, focus on the doable especially for human rights and IHL\u201d (8 October 2012).<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[3]\u00a0 With apologies to Jose Maria Sison a.k.a. Amado Guerrero, Chairman, Central Committee, Communist Party of the Philippines, \u201cOur Urgent Tasks,\u201d Rebolusyon <\/em>(CPP theoretical publication), maiden issue, 1 July 1976.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[4] \u00a0Soliman M. Santos, Jr., \u201cThought\/Discussion Paper on Maximizing the GRP-NDFP CARHRIHL Through its Treaty Connection\u201d (16 November 2004).<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[5] \u00a0Soliman M. Santos, Jr., \u201cA Rights-Based Approach<\/em> to the GRP-MILF<\/em> & GRP-NDFP<\/em> Peace Talks\u201d (11 April 2005).<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[6]\u00a0 Atty. Jose Manuel S. Mamauag, Rights-Based Approach (RBA) as a Tool in Evaluating the Socio-Political Dimensions of the Peace Process with the MILF <\/em>(MNSA thesis, National Defense College of the Philippines, August 2004).<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[7] \u00a0Human Development Network (HDN), Philippine Human Development Report 2005: Peace, Human Security and Human Development in the Philippines <\/em>(Quezon City: Human Development Network [HDN], 2005) 51.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[8] \u00a0Joseph Jadway D. Marasigan, \u201cWanted: rights-based asset reform,\u201d Philippine Daily Inquirer<\/em>, February 15, 2013, p. A14.\u00a0 He chairs the Quezon Association for Rural Development and Democratization Services, Inc. (QARDDS).<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[9]\u00a0 Kaloy Manlupig, \u201cGRP-RPM-M: The Other Peace Process,\u201d accessible at www.balaymindanaw.org\/ bmfi\/essays\/2004\/grp-rpmm.html<\/span>.\u00a0 He heads the NGO called Balay Mindanaw<\/em> which serves as the independent secretariat for the talks, another unconventional feature of this process.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[10]\u00a0 Ike de los Reyes, \u201cThe Bangsamoro Question [and the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity] in the Current Situation\u201d (manuscript, November 2008).<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[11]\u00a0 RPMM Peace Committee, \u201cPosition Paper of the RPMM-RPA on the Demobilization, Disarmament, Reintegration\/Rehabilitation Framework of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines vis-\u00e0-vis Peace Talks\u201d (6 September 2008).<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\n

[12] \u00a0For an overview and case study on these Philippine experiences and lessons in DDR, see Soliman M. Santos, Jr., \u201cChapter 6:\u00a0 DDR and \u2018Disposition of Forces\u2019 of Philippine Rebel Groups (Overview)\u201d and \u201cChapter 7:\u00a0 MNLF Integration into the AFP and the PNP:\u00a0 Successful Cooptation or Failed Transformation? (Case Study)\u201d in Soliman M. Santos, Jr. and Paz Verdades M. Santos, Primed and Purposeful:\u00a0 Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines<\/em> (Geneva:\u00a0 South-South Network for Non-State Armed Group Engagement and the Small Arms Survey, 2010) 139-84.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Terminated Peace Talks, Intensified Armed Conflict:\u00a0 What is to be done?[1] \u00a0By Soliman M. Santos, Jr. Naga City, 27 May 2013 (On the 55th birth anniversary of the late Jesse M. Robredo)   \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 For all intents and purposes, the peace negotiations between the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the National Democratic Front of… Read More »Terminated Peace Talks, Intensified Armed Conflict: What is to be done?<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":5,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","episode_type":"","audio_file":"","cover_image":"","cover_image_id":"","duration":"","filesize":"","filesize_raw":"","date_recorded":"","explicit":"","block":"","itunes_episode_number":"","itunes_title":"","itunes_season_number":"","itunes_episode_type":"","jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":false,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2}},"categories":[1],"tags":[79,81,80,82,34,18],"series":[],"speaker":[],"class_list":["post-1017","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bmfi","tag-government-of-the-philippines","tag-gph","tag-national-democratic-front-of-the-philippines","tag-ndfp","tag-peace-process","tag-peace-talks"],"episode_featured_image":false,"episode_player_image":"https:\/\/balaymindanaw.org\/main\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/05\/BM-Podcast-Logo.png","download_link":"","player_link":"","audio_player":false,"episode_data":{"playerMode":"dark","subscribeUrls":{"acast":{"key":"acast","url":"","label":"Acast","class":"acast","icon":"acast.png"},"amazon":{"key":"amazon","url":"","label":"Amazon","class":"amazon","icon":"amazon.png"},"anchor":{"key":"anchor","url":"","label":"Anchor","class":"anchor","icon":"anchor.png"},"apple_podcasts":{"key":"apple_podcasts","url":"","label":"Apple 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Terminated Peace Talks, Intensified Armed Conflict: What is to be done?<\/a><\/blockquote>